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ABSTRACT
According to Richard Gelwick, one of the fundamental implications of Polanyi’s epistemology is 
that all intellectual disciplines are inherently heuristic. This article draws out the implications 
of a heuristic vision of theology latent in Polanyi’s thought by placing contemporary theologian 
David Brown’s dynamic understanding of tradition, imagination, and revelation in the context 
of a Polanyian-inspired vision of reality. Consequently, such a theology will follow the example 
of science, reimagining its task as one of discovery rather than mere reflection on a timeless 
body of divine revelation. The ongoing development of a theological tradition thus involves the 
attempt to bring one’s understanding of the question of God to bear on the whole of the human 
experience. The pursuit of theology as a heuristic endeavor is a bold attempt to construct an 
integrated vision of nothing less than the entirety of all that is, without absolutizing one’s vision, 
and without giving up on the question of truth.
Engaging Polanyi Theologically
Richard Gelwick once remarked that the “impact of Polanyi’s philosophy would be to change the 
fundamental ground plans of contemporary theology” (Gelwick 1975, 311). In a similar vein, Avery 
Dulles commented that “a thoroughgoing renewal of theology along the lines indicated by Polanyi could 
profitably engage the joint efforts of many theologians for a considerable span of years” (Dulles 1984, 
550). Following the lead of Gelwick, Dulles, and numerous other theologians who have recognized the 
theological significance of Michael Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy and who have critically interacted 
with his thought in diverse and fruitful ways, I would like more carefully to consider the distinct vision 
of theological inquiry latent in Polanyi’s philosophy.1
In light of this preliminary consideration, it is crucial to remember that Polanyi was not a theologian, 
but first a chemist, then a philosopher. While it is true that he did make some penetrating insights into the 
nature of religion (Polanyi 1963, 4-14; STSR, 116-30; PK, 279-86; M, 149-60), for the most part he was 
content to speak about religion and theology in general terms.2 For this reason, we concur with Dulles 
that “Polanyi’s value for theology lies less in what he explicitly stated about theological questions than 
in the transfer value of what he had to say about science” (Dulles 1984, 550). If we are to discover the 
untapped theological potential of Polanyi’s philosophy, it will be by attending to the implications of his 
epistemology.
Towards a Heuristic Theology
 
According to Gelwick, Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge implies that all intellectual disciplines 
are inherently heuristic (Gelwick 1975, 305). The word “heuristic” is used here to connote the potential 
5for novel discovery and an openness to continual exploration; it is intended to convey a sense of dyna-
mism and mystery. And so the theologian will wonder: what might it mean to suggest that theology is a 
heuristic endeavor? This article offers a response to this question.
The initial phase of the article provides context for an answer to the question by outlining the main 
features of a “heuristic vision of reality” along Polanyian lines. The second phase proceeds to give an 
example of a contemporary theologian whose methodology is congruent with what a corresponding heu-
ristic theology might look like. By examining David Brown’s theological method against the backdrop 
of our heuristic vision of reality, paying special attention to his groundbreaking work on the interplay 
of revelation, tradition, and imagination, it will quickly become clear that Brown’s model is extremely 
compatible with such an understanding of reality. This brings me to my central claim: David Brown’s 
approach to theology can in fact be seen as a fulfillment of the heuristic vision of theology latent in Po-
lanyi’s philosophy.
After completing these two phases, I will draw attention to six main points of contact between the two 
models and finally offer a few brief comments on how this project sets the stage for further exploration.
A Heuristic Vision of Reality
The Triadic Structure of Tacit Knowing 
It will be helpful to begin our sketch of a heuristic vision of reality with a brief summary of the most 
salient features of Polanyi’s epistemology. This is not to assert that tacit knowing needs to be understood as 
the center of Polanyi’s work, but only that it provides a point of departure for this project.   He starts with 
the presupposition that in all forms of knowing—intellectual, practical, or perceptual—“we know more than 
we can tell” (TD, 4, emphasis original). By emphasizing the personal participation of the knower in every 
act of knowing, Polanyi articulates a holistic theory of knowledge that effectively bypasses the objectiv-
ist/subjectivist dichotomy.3 This novel theory of personal knowledge is characterized by the recognition 
of an unspecifiable Gestalt-like integration/shift that happens when a person indwells a particular set of 
subsidiary elements, attending from them to their focal/joint meaning (M, 34ff.; KB, 138-58; PK, 55-8). 
Consequently, meaning lies in the comprehension of a set of particulars with respect to the emergence of 
a novel comprehensive entity. Because this act of comprehension is a personal accomplishment that can 
neither be replaced by a formal operation nor fully specified in its process, Polanyi refers to it as “tacit 
knowing” (M, 38ff.; TD, 9ff.). The structure of tacit knowing is itself triadic in nature: (1) a knower (2) 
attends from a set of subsidiaries (3) towards a focal awareness of a meaningful whole or comprehensive 
entity (M, 38ff.). This triadic structure is indicative of the harmonious relationship between the knower 
and what is known (TD, 4). Because all knowing is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing (KB, 144), 
the human capacity for tacit integration “underlies our routine intellectual life as well as the momentous 
breakthroughs of modern science” (Gelwick 1975, 303). 
The Dialectic of Reality/Discovery
The relationship between Polanyi’s epistemology and his ontology becomes clear at this point: in 
all instances of tacit knowing there is a correspondence between the structure of comprehension and the 
structure of the comprehensive entity of which it is a part (TD, 33-4). This allows us to recognize the 
presence of a dialectic at the heart of his ontology, that between reality and discovery. To make a discovery 
about reality, to designate something as “real,” is to “expect that it may yet manifest its effectiveness in an 
indefinite and perhaps wholly unexpected manner” (PK, 279-86; M, 116). One can only discover something 
that was already there, “ready to be discovered” (SM, 34), and at the beginning of our pursuit “we can 
6know only quite vaguely what we may hope to discover” (Polanyi 1981, 97). Contrary to the objectivist 
ideal in science—which Polanyi consistently opposed as delusional and false (PK, 18; M, 25ff.)—the 
acquisition (i.e., discovery) of provisional knowledge about reality in this framework “consists in the 
exploration and elaboration of the relation, rather than in the conquest of an alien object” (Grant 1987, 
266). Truth is thus understood as the expression of a relation between a personal affirmation made with 
universal intent and an objective reality. Because truth is a process directed from the real to an articulate 
expression of the real, and because this establishes a relationship between the knower and the known, the 
act of knowing a reality and giving it articulate expression is something persons do rather than something 
they observe (PK, 254). From a Polanyian perspective, knowing is not a possession but a skill.
The correspondence of the structures of knowing and what is known provides another insight about 
the reality/discovery dialectic. Quite simply, the irreducible structure of tacit knowing suggests a cor-
responding irreducibility to the structure of reality. As expected, its irreducibility is also threefold: (1) 
a knower indwells a set of unspecifiable subsidiary clues, (2) the process by which a knower integrates 
these clues is not fully definable, and (3) our expectation is that the “future manifestations indicated by 
this coherence are inexhaustible” (Polanyi 1981, 97). Because each aspect of the discovery process is 
dynamic and nonlinear, the acquisition of knowledge by a “systematic” process or “prescribed manipula-
tion” would be akin to making a survey rather than a discovery (SFS, 14).4 This allows us to appreciate an 
essential element of the discovery process: that there can be no success “without the thrusting imagination 
that pours itself into seemingly varied clues until they form a whole” (Gelwick 1975, 304). Every act of 
discovery testifies to the provisional nature of our knowledge of reality on the one hand, and the vital 
role played by the creative imagination on the other (Scott 1970, 50). The pursuit of truth is a heuristic, 
imaginative endeavor.
The Dynamic Force of an Inexhaustible Reality
Keep in mind that the capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected ways is attributed to the 
fact that “the thing observed is an aspect of reality, possessing a significance that is not exhausted by 
our conception of any single aspect of it” (TD, 32).5 If we allow the creative act of discovery to exist in 
dynamic tension with the provisional status of our knowledge and the capacity of reality to continually 
reveal itself in meaningful ways, a heuristic vision begins to emerge. To attribute the status of “reality” 
to a discovery—at least for a scientific discovery—is “to believe that it refers to no chance configuration 
of things, but to a persistent connection of certain features, a connection which, being real, will yet man-
ifest itself in numberless ways, inexhaustibly” (Polanyi 1981, 93). This suggests that the hidden reality 
guiding the discoverer is a dynamic force. Polanyi explains it like this: “At the end of the quest the vision 
is becalmed in the contemplation of the reality revealed by a discovery; but the vision is renewed and be-
comes dynamic again” (Polanyi 1981, 93). Subsequently, when taken up by others, this renewed, dynamic 
vision has the power to guide them into new discoveries. To give an “articulate expression” of the real, 
i.e., to make a discovery about an aspect of reality, not only says something true about reality, but it also 
opens up the possibility for future discoveries. Every discovery increases our knowledge of what is true 
while simultaneously expanding the horizon of what we do not (yet) know. This is why Polanyi explains 
that while a discovery does reveal something new about reality, “the new vision which accompanies it 
is not knowledge. It is less than knowledge, for it is a guess; but it is more than knowledge, for it is a 
foreknowledge of things yet unknown and at present perhaps inconceivable” (PK, 135). A heuristic vision 
of reality entails a dialectical movement between provisional-truth/future-discovery.
The Ontological Status of Heuristic Vision
Given the provisional status of knowledge in a heuristic vision of reality, by what measure do we 
uncover the significance of the ontological aspect of tacit knowing? Polanyi’s approach to this question 
7is as suggestive as it is counterintuitive. He regards the “significance of a thing as more important than 
its tangibility” (TD, 33). He famously quipped that “minds and problems possess a deeper reality than 
cobblestones” (TD, 32-3), which is to say, “that which is most promising in its power to provide a growing 
range of discoveries in the future” (Gelwick 1975, 307) is most real. Bearing in mind the correspondence 
of the structure of comprehension with the structure of the comprehensive entity, we can draw out an 
important consequence of this counterintuitive idea concerning the higher levels of existence, such as 
minds and ideas. The participation of the knower in the thing known increases as the objects of knowledge 
ascend to higher levels and the “observer also applies ever higher standards of appreciation to the things 
known by him” (SM, 94-5). For John Apczynski, what this means is that eventually our knowledge of the 
known ceases to be an observation and instead becomes an encounter (Apczynski 1977, 160). Knowledge 
of higher level comprehensive entities has a distinct perichoretic flavor.6
The Heuristic Circularity of Tradition
This brings us to a key feature of a heuristic vision of reality: tradition. Quite simply, the evolution 
of any heuristic vision is a thoroughgoing communal affair. Communities preserve funds of personal 
knowledge in “traditions” (PK, 53). A tradition is a collection of mutually agreed upon premisses and 
assumptions. Without them, every creative endeavor of every human community would cease to exist 
(SFS, 56). Take the example of science: “Science is a system of beliefs to which we are committed. Such 
a system cannot be accounted for either from experience as seen within a different system, or by reason 
without experience. Yet this does not signify that we are free to take or leave it, but simply reflects that 
it is a system of beliefs to which we are committed and which therefore cannot be represented in non-
committal terms” (PK, 171). Scientists can only make use of a tradition by placing themselves under its 
service and committing to it. But the communal character of a tradition in nowise precludes the important 
creative work of the individual. The communal character of a tradition simply requires that individual 
initiatives “must accept for their guidance a traditional authority, enforcing its own self-renewal by cul-
tivating originality among its followers” (Polanyi 1962, 70). Polanyi further describes the influence of a 
tradition in terms of a “spiritual reality” standing over a community that compels their allegiance (SFS, 
54).7 Insofar as “our believing is conditioned at its source by our belonging” (PK, 322), the authority this 
spiritual reality exercises over a tradition reflects the “heuristic circularity”of every commitment. 8 This 
circularity, I contend, is a feature of the human experience that is to be both celebrated and appreciated, 
not explained away.
Tradition as Dynamic Orthodoxy
Pursuing science without a commitment to indwell its creeds and confessions would be to accept 
a positivist picture of science and regard its tradition as pure orthodoxy. In contrast to a static or pure 
orthodoxy, Polanyi describes the tradition guiding scientific inquiry in terms of “dynamic orthodoxy” 
(Polanyi 1962, 70). Colin Grant succinctly captures Polanyi’s position here: “What distinguishes Polanyi’s 
view of science and makes it dynamic orthodoxy is his suggestion that the orthodoxy of science, far from 
being firm and final in fact or even in intent, serves rather to provide a base for encouraging opposition to 
itself” (Grant 1988, 414; cf. Polanyi 1962, 54). In and of themselves, tradition and orthodoxy are static. 
They can only maintain a heuristic significance when they form a dialectic in which every affirmation 
contains an implicit challenge for clarification and further development.
The normative character of a tradition is in no way undercut by the demand that it be continually 
challenged and re-envisioned. Polanyi explains that it is “inherent in the nature of scientific authority that 
in transmitting itself to a new generation it should invite opposition to itself and assimilate this opposition 
in a reinterpretation of the scientific tradition” (SFS, 15-6). Inasmuch as a “dynamic orthodoxy claims 
to be a guide in search of truth, it implicitly grants the right of opposition in the name of truth” (Polanyi 
81962, 70). This is how a heuristic vision of reality addresses the question of truth: it is precisely this “tran-
scendence of truth over any particular approximation to it [that] facilitates the combination of orthodoxy 
and dynamism” (Grant 1988, 415). This is not to say that truth is some purely objective reality floating 
around “out there” that can only be grasped and approximated with asymptotic accuracy, but rather that 
truth claims never exhaust the real. Nevertheless, this combination of challenge and affirmation, of assent 
and dissent, is made possible by the fundamental assumption that our knowledge of the world, what we 
consider to be true, is always a glimpse of a much richer reality.9 Thus we are in accord with Gelwick’s 
summary of Polanyi’s position: “Tradition serves as the grounds for discovery and in turn renews and finds 
its own depth” (Gelwick 1975, 319). A heuristic vision of reality grounded in commitment to a tradition 
allows us to appreciate that the relationship of reality/discovery generates a powerful feedback loop.
Tradition, Responsibility, and Universal Intent
A tradition that values dynamic orthodoxy carries with it a special responsibility: there is a “‘sense of 
calling’ that results when those committed to a tradition undertake pioneering efforts to make fresh contacts 
with the realities that they have been trained to serve” (Milavec 2006, 465). By establishing the normative 
place of heuristic vision in every act of knowing, we place a great responsibility on the one articulating a 
particular comprehensive vision. Articulating the vision of a comprehensive entity while being mindful 
of and faithful to the “accidents of personal existence” is, for Polanyi, the essence of humanity’s calling 
(PK, 322; cf. Langford 1966, 45-6). Even though the vision of a comprehensive entity emerges from a 
particular tradition, at a particular time, among a particular community, those who articulate it assume 
the requisite task of clarifying the nature and character of that vision with “universal intent” (M, 195). 
Universal intent can easily be misunderstood. Because we cannot know whether or not our vision 
will be accepted, Polanyi suggests that we think of our claims in terms of aiming for universal intent 
rather than “established universality” (TD, 78). Universal intent is not the absolutization of our vision, 
nor an attribute of our understanding, but rather the goal of our provisional understanding. Polanyi even 
suggests that this desire for universal intent could be understood as a clue to God: “We undertake the task 
of attaining the universal in spite of our admitted infirmity, which should render the task hopeless, because 
we hope to be visited by powers for which we cannot account in terms of our specific capabilities. This 
I hope is a clue to God…” (PK, 324).10 
Summary
Not surprisingly, the foregoing sketch of a heuristic vision of reality along Polanyian lines is incom-
plete and only provisional. We have identified three dialectical movements inherent to a heuristic vision of 
reality. The interplay of reality/discovery is naturally accompanied by the dialectic of affirmation/negation 
in a holistic, dynamic vision that recognizes the provisional nature of truth articulately expressed with 
universal intent. The need for a dialectic of particularity/universality becomes clear when a provisional 
expression of the real is offered with hope of universal intent by a particular person indwelling a partic-
ular tradition. We can now trace the contours of David Brown’s model of theological inquiry in hopes of 
catching a glimpse of heuristic theology in action. 
David Brown: A Case Study of Heuristic Theology
Background
David Brown is a contemporary Christian theologian in the Anglican tradition. Born in Scotland in 
1948, he is currently the Wardlaw Professor of Theology, Aesthetics, and Culture at the University of St. 
9Andrews. Early in his career he focused on the relation between theology and philosophy, but in more 
recent years his interests have expanded to the relationship between theology and culture, more specifically, 
the relationship between theology and the arts. Between 1999 and 2008 he published a five volume series 
extensively addressing the relationship between theology, philosophy, the arts, and human culture. One 
commentator describes this series as “one of the most ambitious projects of contemporary theology and 
represents a substantial challenge to currently dominant perspectives across a range of important issues” 
(King, MacSwain, and Fout 2012, 328).11 Totaling nearly two thousand pages, it would be impossible to 
do justice to the full spectrum of Brown’s thought in such a short space. Because our primary interest is his 
theological methodology, we will focus on the first two volumes, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation 
and Change (1999) and Discipleship and Imagination: Christian Tradition and Truth (2000).
Primary Themes
Brown’s groundbreaking theology is distinguished by a unique array of interlaced motifs: an emphasis 
on the vital role of the imagination in theological inquiry; a closing of the gap between revelation and 
tradition; a sustained demonstration of the culturally conditioned, provisionally mediated, and continually 
developing character of revelation; the recognition of the Christian Scriptures as a “moving text”; the 
blurring of a distinction between Scripture and tradition; the expansion of God’s revelatory activity beyond 
the confines of the Christian tradition into the realms of secular philosophy, other religious traditions, and 
the arts; the rejection of a sharp distinction between natural and revealed theology; the prioritization of the 
incarnation over the atonement. He is a Christian theologian through and through, and his overwhelming 
commitment is to a “God of mystery who has disclosed something of that divinity to humanity but with 
an inexhaustible richness that means . . . there always remains something more to discover, something 
more to delight the senses and the intellect” (Brown 2008, 26). 
The Philosophical Trajectory of Brown’s Argument
Before we begin to unpack his theology, we should consider a few of his philosophical convictions. 
Charting a course between the Enlightenment’s over-emphasis on historical criticism and the postmodern 
conviction that objectivity and truth are either a priori out of reach or empty categories, Brown grants the 
postmodern position that all thought is conditioned and involves antecedent commitments while rejecting 
the tendency to caricature the Enlightenment as nothing more than an excess of rationalism. He seeks 
to avoid the contemporary extremes of unqualified advocacy of the virtues of Enlightenment objectivity 
on the one hand, and the retreat from its challenges into the allegedly self-validating claims of Christi-
anity on the other (Brown 1999, 106). He recognizes that our basic problem is not that we are forced to 
undertake the pursuit of pure, disinterested objectivity lest we grease the slippery slope of unadulterated 
relativism, but that the strict opposition of objectivity to subjectivity is as false a dichotomy in theological 
epistemology as it is in any epistemological framework.
 
In Brown’s analysis, one of modernity’s principal faults is its inclination to show contempt for tradi-
tion. The chief error of the Enlightenment, specifically, was not in looking more widely than any particular 
tradition but in supposing that this entailed the death of tradition rather than its enrichment (Brown 1999, 
106). He recognizes that traditions often mature and develop through interaction with alternatives, and not 
always in opposition to them (Brown 1999, 106). Provided that the traditions to which we are committed 
“are allowed to function as open, both towards their past and to the wider context in which they are set,” 
Brown is convinced that “being aware of the traditions upon which one inevitably draws is what makes 
progress possible” (Brown 1999, 11). Contrary to the conventional wisdom of modern rationalism, ac-
knowledging our dependence upon, participation in, and commitment to a tradition in no way undermines 
the search for knowledge and understanding. Brown’s critique of modernity on this point should not be 
understood as an unqualified endorsement of the extreme postmodern response, where our antecedent 
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presuppositions “become exempt from any form of effective critique” (Brown 1999, 52) on account of the 
circular nature of the hermeneutic event. Quite the contrary. The postmodern insight into the conditioned 
character of all thought demands that each of our commitments be subject to potential critique.
The Incarnation: The Centripetal Force of Brown’s Theology
One of Brown’s primary theological objectives is to demonstrate that no sharp lines of demarcation 
can be drawn among revelation, Scripture, and the Christian tradition: “Tradition, so far from being some-
thing secondary or reactionary, is the motor that sustains revelation both within Scripture and beyond” 
(Brown 1999, 1). Brown embraces the hermeneutical circularity of his position by acknowledging that his 
argument begins with a commitment to the reality of the incarnation (Brown 1999, 101). In other words, 
Brown makes no apology for indwelling the Christian tradition even while he reimagines key elements 
of it. The logic of Brown’s argument for prioritizing the incarnation is straightforward. For persons to be 
both truly human and genuinely sane, they cannot think themselves as being divine (Brown 1999, 278). 
This means that, at least initially, Jesus of Nazareth could not have understood himself as the Divine Son 
of God (Brown 1999, 320).12 The corresponding Christology requires that the incarnation be understood 
as “a real kenosis” (Brown 1999, 299).13 There is thus a high degree of “accommodation to the human 
condition in the incarnation” (Brown 1999, 276). If the incarnation can be understood as the greatest point 
of God’s involvement with humanity, then it follows that “God submitted perception of himself to the 
vagaries of a developing tradition; so why not elsewhere also?” (Brown 1999, 275).  Brown’s commitment 
to a dynamic, unfolding tradition is immediately related to his understanding of incarnation.
The Imagination: The Centrifugal Force of Brown’s Theology
Misunderstanding the role played by the imagination in the theological task has largely contributed 
to sharp divisions among Scripture, revelation, and tradition (Brown 1999, 274). Whereas the incarna-
tion acts as the gravitational center of Brown’s theology, drawing the community together in a shared 
commitment to God’s activity in Jesus of Nazareth, the human imagination acts as a catalyst for change, 
ensuring that the tradition never becomes stagnant and is always striving for cultural relevance, all in the 
name of being faithful to the trajectory of the tradition. Emphasizing the incarnation as accommodation 
to the vagaries of a developing tradition highlights “the necessary exercise of the imagination as the story 
[is] retold in the light” (Brown 1999, 299) of new social triggers. All else being equal, the inertia of a 
theological community promotes consistency over change.14 Imaginative reappropriations of the tradition 
become necessary when they are given some “external prod” by changing social and historical situations 
(Brown 1999, 187-8). Of course, this is not to suggest that culture is the only catalyst for re-imagining 
the meaning of a tradition’s key symbols and central commitments.
Of equal importance is the recognition that “the contribution of the imagination to understanding the 
significance of Christ by no means ended with the closure of the New Testament canon” (Brown 1999, 
321). Once we allow the trajectory of incarnational belief to feed back upon itself, we will realize that 
the community makes an indelible mark on the unfolding tradition and in so doing has the capacity to 
actually “improve’” upon the contents of the original narrative or event (Brown 1999, 76-7). This is the 
basis for treating the Scriptures as a “moving text” (Brown 1999, 301).15 Some will undoubtedly bristle 
at the notion of improving the contents of the original biblical narrative. If nothing else, this means that 
theological inquiry is more than fanciful speculation or mere reflection on the past; much is at stake in 
this potentially risky endeavor. If we truly believe that our words-about-God can and do change the way 
we indwell our world, if not the world itself—and why would we want to do theology if this were not 
the case—then theology is a dangerous enterprise that carries with it great responsibility, and making 
claims that go against the grain of tradition should not be made lightly if and when they must be made. 
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The advantage the imagination has over a purely linear, mathematical type of rationality is in its 
ability to think laterally, to allow for combinations not yet present in the mind or in nature (Brown 2000, 
352). Even if all such connections were merely located in the mind, they would still be illuminating on 
account of the fact that becoming aware of a “symbolic field in the unconscious can alert us to other 
options, in particular that not everything that is ‘known’ has necessarily already been conceptualized” 
(Brown 2000, 353). This is not intended to drive a wedge between reason and the imagination as resources 
for accessing truth. Quite the opposite: this whole approach seeks a rapprochement between faith and 
reason, the imagination and tradition. Bottom line, the imagination allows for the possibility of remapping 
reality, not just with respect to what is already known, but with respect to what could be known as well 
(Brown 200, 360). Linking the imagination with the remapping of what could be known creates a space 
for revelation that emerges from the inside, as it were.
A Dynamic Understanding of Revelation
While Brown makes no attempt to give an account of the precise location where revelation occurs, 
as he believes this would be a mistake, it is clear that wherever revelation happens in space and time, 
the imagination plays a vital role. While revelation can be experienced as an event, sensually, we only 
have access to the meaning of revelation through our capacity to reason, to imagine (Brown 1999, 6). For 
Brown, this means revelation is not confined to the boundaries of the Christian tradition. His endorsement 
of the postmodern insight into the conditioned character of all thought leads him to expect that “God 
might have interacted with more than one religious tradition over the course of the centuries” (Brown 
1999, 136). The ongoing reflection and imaginative rewriting of the tradition is itself part of the process 
of divine disclosure (Brown 1999, 169). God’s accommodation to the human condition in the incarnation 
means that revelation will always be tied to a developing tradition, but never limited to a single one.
Thinking of tradition as the human reflection on an original and unchanging divine discourse has 
obviously been a part of the Christian tradition for a long time, for better or worse. Brown realizes this, 
but is concerned that such an approach does not adequately account for the ways in which “all human 
expression is embodied within, and limited by, particular cultural contexts” (Brown 2012, 267). He fur-
ther argues that throughout human history, access to the divine was the norm rather than the exception, 
as it was commonly believed that God was available to be experienced everywhere (Brown 2012, 266). 
As far as Brown is concerned, the problem of religious experience and the challenge of biblical criticism 
is evidence of a crisis in both natural and revealed theology. He is not interested in downplaying the 
contributions these two approaches have made to the Christian tradition even though he is convinced 
that these “commonly-assumed frameworks are altogether too narrow” (Brown 2012, 266-7). Much and 
more could be said about the disintegration of the divide between natural/revealed theology, but at this 
point, suffice to say that a rapprochement of these two discourses is one of the most significant theological 
implications of Brown’s work.16
A Dynamic Understanding of Tradition
Brown consistently argues against the common prejudice that treats tradition as something static, a 
prejudice that relegates it to the status of “mere inheritance of the past” (Brown 1999, 30). For Brown 
nothing could be further from the truth. The history of Christianity illustrates this: “even tradition itself 
needs first to be undermined before it can acquire a capacity for further development” (Brown 1999, 51). 
Further precedent for this is found in the Christian Scriptures. We could say that the Scriptures themselves 
give us permission to undermine them in the name of fidelity to the tradition. Brown shows how the 
Scriptures are part of a developing tradition by citing examples of how they imaginatively reappropriate 
material from the past to address questions of the present.17 Because the Scriptures do not address every 
possible social situation, it seems reasonable to expect that when a tradition encounters new social condi-
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tions it might generate new insights and then incorporate them back into the tradition (Brown 1999, 71). 
Brown suggests that these social triggers are themselves part of the revelatory process and evidence that 
the text itself cannot be understood as the exclusive generator of meanings. Rather than thinking about the 
Bible as the “already fully painted canvas and the traditions of the later Church as offering at most some 
optional extra colouring, we need to think of a continuous dynamic of tradition operating both within the 
Bible and beyond” (Brown 1999, 365).
Three Advantages of Brown’s Proposal
Brown identifies three major advantages to this proposal (Brown 1999, 365ff.). The first is that it can 
release Christians from constantly trying to find justification in Scripture for positions that are more naturally 
read as later self-understandings. For example, rather than arguing that Jesus wasn’t opposed to divorce or 
that Paul was in favor of homosexuality, Brown suggests that discussion of these issues should be focused 
on the trajectory set by the tradition, rather than the specific commitments of the tradition at a given time 
in history. Secondly, the Bible would no longer have an impossible burden placed on it. Biblical history 
would cease to be a unique exception to the normal pattern of divine action, thus requiring the church to 
take responsibility for its history. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in Brown’s model, Christians 
would be allowed to take seriously revelation as it occurs in other religions and disciplines. Insufficient 
attention has been given to this point in this essay, but this is undeniably one of the primary benefits of his 
model. It challenges the assumption that the efficacy of revelation is somehow undermined if “external 
material from the surrounding culture is used to illuminate or even rewrite its story” (Brown 1999, 104).
Points of Contact
The foregoing analysis is ample evidence of the compatibility of the Polanyian and Brownian para-
digms. I will now consider the six most salient points of contact between them. This will serve as a road 
map for reading Brown’s model as an embodiment of a Polanyian-inspired heuristic theology. 
1. Overturning the Subject/Object Dichotomy
Both models challenge the assumption of a fundamental split between the knowing subject and 
the object known. A heuristic vision of reality accomplishes this by demonstrating the correspondence 
between the subject/object in the triadic structure of tacit knowing. Brown accomplishes this by blazing 
an epistemological trail between caricatures of modernity and corresponding extremes of postmodernity. 
Both thinkers realize the choice is not between disinterested objectivity and unadulterated subjectivity, 
but between reductive and non-reductive views of the ontology/epistemology relationship. Polanyi’s 
challenge to the objectivist ideal in modern science no more leads down the slippery slope of relativism 
than Brown’s emphasis on the human imagination rules out the possibility of divine revelation.
2. The Priority of the Creative Imagination
Both models recognize the central role of the imagination in all acts of human knowing. A heuristic 
vision of reality recognizes the interplay of intuition and imagination in all acts of knowing, from sci-
entific discovery to knowledge of other minds. For Brown, it is only our capacity to imagine that allows 
us to participate in the unfolding drama of revelation. There is also a further, deeper connection between 
Brown’s notion of imagination as lateral thinking and Polanyi’s conviction that we know more than we 
can tell. Brown argues that the imagination allows us to remap reality—not only with respect to what is 
already known, but with respect to what could be known.18 This supports his argument that not everything 
that is known has already been conceptualized. Clearly, this is similar to the idea that we know more than 
we can tell. Furthermore, Brown’s notion that the creative imagination has the capacity to remap reality 
dovetails with a Polanyian understanding of discovery.
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3. Discovery
Both models place an emphasis on discovery, even though they use different language in so doing. As 
we have seen, the notion of discovery is a central feature of a heuristic vision of reality. While discovering 
hidden areas of reality and bringing them to our understanding has long been a hallmark of science, in 
Gelwick’s estimation, this example has unfortunately not been followed in theology (Gelwick 1975, 301). 
Aaron Milavec explains that in “contrast to modern science, Christianity has often been characterized as 
commitment to the mere repetition and preservation of a onetime discovery about God revealed through 
Jesus” (Milavec 2006, 48). Gelwick wonders if this type of approach to theology might partially explain 
“why the layman today does not really expect much from theologians except trite clichés of the past” 
(Gelwick 1975, 301). Brown’s model seriously challenges such an approach to theology. His commit-
ment to a God of mystery disclosing reality to humanity with an inexhaustible richness means that “there 
always remains something more to discover, something more to delight the senses and the intellect” 
(Brown 2008, 26). A heuristic vision of reality challenges theology to follow the example of science and 
come to understand its task as the ongoing discovery of the richness of reality rather than reflection on 
a static deposit of revelation preserved in a holy book. The upshot is that theologians would no longer 
be understood as mere “expositors of the past,” but instead as “explorers of the present claiming to have 
an important angle of understanding reality and expecting to learn new things from it” (Gelwick 1975, 
315). This is precisely what Brown is arguing for when he suggests that, “instead of thinking of tradition 
as purely human reflection added to an original and unchanging divine discourse . . . we need to see that 
continuing human reflection [is] itself an indispensable part of the process of divine discourse” (Brown 
1999, 169). At this point, the heuristic character of Brown’s theology becomes abundantly clear.
4. Inexhaustibility of Reality
Both models conceive of reality as inherently inexhaustible. From a Polanyian perspective, the irre-
ducible structure of tacit knowing implies a corresponding inexhaustibility to the structures of reality. In 
a heuristic vision of reality, that which is most real has the capacity of manifesting itself in unpredictable, 
inexhaustible ways. Only that which is real can properly be discovered, and discovery always opens up 
the possibility of more discovery. From a Brownian perspective, there is a requisite commitment to a 
“God of mystery who has disclosed something of that divinity to humanity but with an inexhaustible 
richness . . .” (Brown 2008, 26). 
5. The Primacy of Tradition
Both models maintain that there is no knowledge outside of participation in a community of shared 
commitments (i.e., outside of tradition). Both models further recognize the heuristic/hermeneutical 
circularity of these commitments. Scientists and Christian theologians alike must be committed to the 
particular set of presuppositions and methods appropriate to their tradition if they are to carry out their 
work. Attempting to ground commitment noncommittally is a non-starter in both cases. 
6. The Dynamic Nature of Orthodoxy & Revelation
Both models realize the dynamic nature of a tradition. Both models recognize that the viability of a 
tradition is related to its ability to continually undermine itself in the name of development, relevance, 
and truth. A tradition matures only when its affirmations are accompanied by a corresponding invitation 
to challenge the legitimacy of its affirmations. The dynamic orthodoxy of tradition in a heuristic vision 
of reality implicitly grants the right of opposition to it in the name of truth and faithfulness. For Brown, 
God’s accommodation to the vagaries of a developing tradition in the incarnation attest to the reality 
of dynamic revelation and the need for a tradition to continually re-imagine itself in light of our best 




Andrew Grosso’s diagnosis of the challenges facing the theological enterprise provides context to 
the urgency of embracing what I have been calling a heuristic vision of theology: “One of the primary 
challenges facing the theological enterprise is the need to make itself understandable within the broader 
social and cultural context in which it exists, a context that may be in no way beholden to the religious 
commitments that inspire and support any particular vision” (Grosso 2007, 32). Transferring the value of 
this heuristic vision of reality into a corresponding model of theology thus carries with it the additional 
responsibility of articulating a vision of God that is grounded in tradition, strives for universal intent, 
and yet resists “the tendency to absolutize the content of its vision” (Grosso 2007, 32). As far as I am 
concerned, this challenge can only be met if theology becomes willing to engage in genuine interdis-
ciplinary conversation, and thus becomes willing to reimagine one or more of its central commitments 
when necessary. For numerous reasons, a heuristic theology is well equipped for such conversation, not 
the least of which is its refusal to absolutize its claims. Grosso recognizes that when the elements of a 
theological vision become intractable, it inevitably marginalizes itself within the broader culture (Grosso 
2007, 32). The stagnation of a theological vision would represent a fundamental “betrayal of the implicit 
purposes of a heuristic vision, that is, the ongoing effort to understand better a reality that is expected to 
continue to reveal itself in new and unforeseen ways” (Grosso 2007, 32-3). 
Brown offers a model of theology that naturally resists stagnation. By following Brown’s analysis 
of the role played by the imagination in the development of a religious tradition, and by implicitly plac-
ing this analysis in the broader context of Polanyi’s challenge to the objectivist ideal—an ideal that has 
served to divide theology from science—we have seen how Brown’s appeal to the imagination allows 
him to close the gap between tradition and revelation in theological discourse, untethering theology from 
anything that might resemble a “positivism of revelation” (Green 1989, 34). He has also found a way to 
treat other religions as sources of revelation without compromising the integrity of Christianity, thereby 
creating an avenue for rich, inter-religious dialogue. Heuristic theology thus sees itself as but one voice 
in a much larger discourse. A heuristic theology is inherently interdisciplinary.
  
Bearing in mind that in a heuristic vision of reality what is most real is that which is most significant 
and most promising to expand the horizon of future discovery, in a corresponding theological vision, 
systematic reflection on what is most real, significant, and promising will involve the attempt to bring 
one’s understanding of the question of God to bear on the whole of the human experience. The pursuit 
of a genuinely heuristic theology is thus boldly attempting to construct an integrated vision of nothing 
less than the entirety of all that is. It can be seen as an attempt to give an account of the infinite from 
the perspective of the finite such that the infinite necessarily includes the finite, but is not a simple con-
glomeration of it. This of course assumes that the finite is capable of imagining and/or experiencing the 
infinite in meaningful ways. 
As a theologian in pursuit of what it means to live as a Christian, I am interested in embodying a mode 
of theological discourse that is faithful to the kind of God I see at the center of the Christian tradition: a 
God that is creative, dynamic, and incarnate; an inexhaustible reality that can neither be reduced to the 
metaphysical Big Other beyond the sky nor limited to a projection of human culture and/or the human 
psyche. Such a pursuit is greatly enhanced by wrestling with the Polanyian tradition. A heuristic theology 
not only allows us to see our project as one of perpetual development, change, growth, and response, but 
also one that recognizes saying words-about-God happens within the broader human experience, implying 
that a heuristic theology sees the sciences, the arts, and other religious traditions as invaluable conver-
sation partners, as discourses that can and do tell us true things about God, the universe, and ourselves. 
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Bottom line: subscribing to a heuristic vision of reality requires a corresponding mode of theological 
inquiry, one that endorses a holistic epistemology, sees reality as an inexhaustible playground, values 
discovery, the creative imagination, a dynamic understanding of orthodoxy and tradition, and aims for 
universal intent without denying that it is inextricably bathed in particularity. This approach to theology 
sees reality as a playground, finds pleasure in playing with ideas, and isn’t afraid to make mistakes even 
while it understands the inherently risky nature of saying words-about-God as well as the immense re-
sponsibility assumed by those who undertake such a potentially dangerous endeavor. A heuristic vision of 
theology recognizes that Christianity contains its own negation, that its radical, subversive core prevents 
it from ever becoming a stagnant system of dogma (for too long), and that it is first and foremost a way 
of living, moving, and being in the world.
Such is the trajectory of theological inquiry latent in Polanyi’s philosophy. It has been my argument 
that Brown’s model largely follows this trajectory, and that his approach can be seen as an embodiment of 
heuristic theology. I have not undertaken this pursuit simply to add clutter to academic shelves by bring-
ing together two thinkers who have hitherto been treated separately. I have undertaken this conversation 
because Polanyi’s thought continues to be a positive conversation partner for the theologian, because I 
am convinced that a heuristic theology has implications that cannot be ignored, and that we can begin 
to appreciate the implications of Polanyi’s work for a mature, dynamic approach to theology by paying 
attention to the exciting work being carried out by David Brown.19
Endnotes
1Based on his analysis of Thomas Torrance’s interaction with Polanyi, Alister McGrath has identified 
a methodological distinction between two ways of theologically appropriating Polanyi’s work: “founda-
tional” and “illuminative.” Whereas illuminative approaches simply involve “pointing out convergence at 
points of significance,” foundational approaches involve a much more sustained engagement that entails 
a “form of total commitment to Polanyi’s general methods or assumptions” (McGrath 1999, 229). Upon 
surveying a selection of theologians who have constructively appropriated Polanyi’s work, theologian 
Andrew Grosso—attending to McGrath’s distinction—argues that “neither approach has managed to 
represent the theological potential of Polanyi’s work with complete success” (Grosso 2007, 114). Grosso 
is not suggesting that these efforts are necessarily misguided. Its simply the case that among those sur-
veyed, those who selectively employed Polanyi in an illuminative manner, “often failed to represent the 
full scope of his thought, and have often been rather narrow in their application of his thought to the task 
of theology,” while those who took the more ambitious foundational approach “often failed to account 
adequately for the dogmatic content of the theological tradition and the responsibilities that inhere with 
its reception and perpetuation” (Grosso 2007, 114). Thus, any theological appropriation of Polanyi’s work 
must be mindful of the limitations typically encountered by exclusively pursuing one approach over the 
other. This is clearly one of Grosso’s chief concerns in his monograph. By not limiting himself exclu-
sively to either approach, he seeks to avoid the pitfalls typical of each. Instead, his intention is “to initiate 
a conversation between Polanyi and the theological tradition with the expectation that there is much to 
be gained on both sides from sustained, meaningful interaction” (Grosso 2007, 114). He further expects 
that “as we examine the correspondence between the theological tradition and Polanyi’s thought, we will 
recognize new ways of approaching familiar theological questions while also seeing the extent to which 
it is only a theological mode of inquiry that can bring to fruition the ambitions of Polanyi’s philosophy” 
(Grosso 2007, 114). I draw attention to these distinctions in hopes of contextualizing my own interaction 
with Polanyi in this paper, which shares Grosso’s intention and expectations.
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2There are few times however when Polanyi does explicitly engage in dialogue with a theologian. 
For example, he interacts with Teilhard de Chardin’s understanding of the human person in “The Mind-
Body Relation” (Polanyi 1968, 102). He also comments on Teilhard’s notion of “noogenesis” in Personal 
Knowledge, 388. But the most consistent interaction he sustained with a theologian was with Paul Tillich. 
There is an (in)famous reference to Tillich in a footnote on page 283 of Personal Knowledge where he 
says that he finds many of his own theological intuitions confirmed in Tillich’s Systematic Theology. He 
also takes Tillich to task on the relationship between science and faith, engaging him extensively in “Faith 
and Reason” and “Science and Religion.”
3Colin Grant observes that the real epistemological issue Polanyi sought to address was not the divide 
between objectivism and subjectivism, but the alleged gulf between the knowing subject and the object 
known. Thus we should recognize that, “the real alternative is not between objectivism and subjectivism, 
but between the assumption of the subject-object dichotomy, which results in this oscillation between 
objectivism and subjectivism on the one hand, and a comprehensive approach, such as Polanyi advocates” 
(Grant 1987, 266). For Grant, Polanyi occasionally “compromises his holistic approach by appearing to 
be advocating subjectivism in reaction against the objectivism he opposes, and, in so doing, overlooks 
some of the most illuminating insights his comprehensive vision can afford,” namely, diagnosing our 
“modern malaise as a form of acute-self consciousness” (Grant 1987, 267). This, Grant refers to as Po-
lanyi’s “near miss.”
4Polanyi identifies two types of problem solving: “systematic” and “heuristic.” The difference between 
them is that while a systematic operation is a “wholly deliberate act, a heuristic process is a combination 
of active and passive stages” (PK, 126) The active stage involves the deliberate process of “preparation” 
and is followed by a period of “incubation” where nothing is done and nothing happens on the level of 
consciousness. The fruit of the investigator’s efforts, the advent of a “happy thought” is not the result of 
deliberate action, it simply “happens” (PK, 126). Elsewhere, in “The Creative Imagination” especially, 
Polanyi emphasizes the roles played by the intuition and imagination in this process. The important point 
is that a heuristic vision of reality prioritizes the roles played by both in the discovery of truth.
5This puts the “real” in Polanyi’s critical realism. Despite his consistent opposition to an objectivist 
epistemology, this makes it clear he does not offer a subjectivist one in its place. He explains that scien-
tists, throughout their inquiries, rely “on the presence of something real hidden out there,” and thus they 
will “necessarily also rely on that external presence for claiming the validity of the result that satisfies 
the question” (Polanyi 1981, 106).
6This has immense consequences for theological epistemology—consequences which I can only here 
provide clues to. In a subsequent article I will flesh out these issues more fully by bringing Polanyi into 
conversation with a particular reading of Hegel.
7In the preface to the second edition, Polanyi says that while he spoke of tradition as a “spiritual 
reality” in the original publication, he later came to think of it as a belief in “the reality of emergent 
meaning and truth” (SFS, 17).
8“Heuristic circularity” is a wonderful little phrase borrowed from Aaron Milavec (Milavec 2006, 474).
9This is why positivism is self-defeating: the quest to capture reality in a knowledge “that is firm and 
final is a denial of life, a pursuit of death” (Grant, 1988, 415).
10There is an uncanny resemblance between Polanyi’s idea here and George Steiner’s “wager on 
transcendence” as the source of all meaning (Steiner 1989, 4).
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11Others have expressed similar appreciation. John Macquarrie described the first volume in the series 
as “the most impressive theological book I have read in quite a long time” (Macquarrie 2001, 471-3).
12Brown wonders if Jesus ever understood himself in this way. Brown further suggests that it is not 
inconceivable to think that Jesus might have understood himself in some sense as sinful—although this 
would in no way make him a sinner.
13For a more sustained treatment of kenosis in Brown’s theology, see Divine Humanity: Kenosis and 
the Construction of a Christian Theology.
14Mark C. Taylor argues this exact point in After God. His aim is to develop a definition of religion 
that is both sensitive to the stabilizing as well as its de-stabilizing movements (Taylor 2007, 12-3).
15The chief criticism raised against Brown on this point is the paucity of clear criteria for determining 
whether or not a development in the tradition is to be considered progressive (i.e., revelatory) or not. 
For as much as Macquarrie praises Brown’s work in his review of Tradition, he sees this as an important 
question left unanswered: “How does one discriminate among those efforts of the imagination? Can 
one decide whether its recreations of an event have a sound basis, or has imagination run away with the 
imaginer?” (Macquarrie 2002, 769). Brown himself acknowledges this weakness in Tradition (375) and 
specifically takes up the issue in Discipleship (389-405), suggesting nine specific criteria for how we can 
decide if a development should be considered consistent with revelation or not.
16This is a classic Anglican position (King, MacSwain, and Fout 2012, 328).
17E.g., the Gospel of John’s treatment of Pentecost (Brown 1999, 60ff.), the different treatments of 
Jesus’ birth story (Brown 1999, 76ff.), and the development of the Abraham narrative (Brown 1999, 227ff.).
18It is interesting that when making this point he cites Eliade, Jung, Lacan, and Lévi-Strauss as ex-
amples of thinkers who recognized this—but not Polanyi (Brown 2000, 353 n. 32).
19This article was originally presented at the Polanyi Society Annual Meeting at the American Academy 
of Religion Annual Meeting on November 22, 2013. The comments offered by the three respondents—Jon 
Fennell, Andrew Grosso, and David Brown—genuinely helped me to clarify my argument and stimulated 
me to think about many of my central claims in new ways. Thanks for your careful reading of my original 
essay and your insightful reflections along the way.
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